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STUDENT NOTES
Seat Belts And Contributory Negligence
Over 53,000 Americans were killed in traffic accidents in 1967.'
This is a rate of more than 1,000 a week or between 100 and 200 a
day. Also in 1967, an additional 1,900,000 persons were injured2
in automobile accidents and the total financial loss from deaths and
injuries exceeded ten billion dollars.3
I NATIONAL SAFETY CoUNcIL, ACCIDENT FAcTs, at 51 (1968 ed.). 53,100
Americans were killed in automobile accidents in 1967.
2 Id. at 40.
Id. at 5. This total includes $7,300,000,000 estimated cost of injuries
and insurance administrative costs and an estimated $3,400,000,000 in property
damage. Not included are costs of certain public agency activities such as
police, fire, and courts; damages awarded in excess of direct cost; and indirect
costs to employers.
1
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Current information indicates that if all passenger car occupants
used safety belts at all times, it would save 8,000 to 10,000 lives
annually.4 However, despite the fact that safety belts are now avail-
able to about two-thirds of all passenger car occupants, the percent-
age of those using seat belts is estimated by the National Safety
Council to be only about twenty-five per cent.5
The implications of these statistics have caused a great deal of
concern among safety officials and lawmakers and, as a result, thirty-
two states6 have enacted legislation which requires the installation of
seat belts in all new automobiles. In addition, five states have sta-
tutes which set standards for all seat belts sold' or require the in-
stallation of anchors for seat belts in all new cars.8 It should be
noted, however, that none of these jurisdictions provide for the
mandatory use of available seat belts after installation except Rhode
Island, which requires the use of seat belts in certain governmental
and public service vehicles.9
These statutes have presented the courts with a very perplexing
legal question: should a person injured in an automobile accident
caused by the negligence of another be denied recovery for his in-
I d. at 53.
SId.
6 ALASKA ADM. CODE tit. 13 ch. 1, § 105.72 (1966); CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 27309 (Supp. 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 14-IOOA (Repl. 1966); GA.
CODE ANN. § 68-1801 (1966); ILL. REV. ANN. STAT. ch. 95/2, § 217.1 (Supp.
1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2241 (1966); IowA CODE ANN. § 321.445
(1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-5, 135 (Supp. 1967); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 29, § 1368A (Repl. 1968); MD. ANN. CODE. art. 66 , § 296A
(1967); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 7 (Supp. 1967); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 9.2410(2) (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. § 169.685 (Supp. 1967); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 8254.5 (Supp. 1966); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.555(1) (1963);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 32-21-150.1 (Supp. 1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-7,
123.05 (Supp. 1965); N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:3-76.2 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 64-20-75 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 383 (Supp.
1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2 (Repl. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-
41.1 (Supp. 1967); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4513.26.2 (Supp. 1967); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12-413 (Supp. 1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.482 (1967);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-23-39 (Supp. 1966); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-930
(1968 Repl. Vol.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 4(29) (1967); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.1-309.1 (Repl. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.37.510 (Supp. 1967);
W. VA. CODE ch. 17c, art. 15, § 43 (Michie 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48
(Supp. 1968). For a discussion and comparision of the various state statutes
pertaining to seat belts see THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC., THE
SEAT BELT DEFENSE, app. A.
7 ARx. STAT. ANN. § 75.733 (Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 317.951
(Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 843 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 41,
§ 41-6-148.10 (Supp. 1967).
8 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.125 (1963).
9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-23-41 (Supp. 1966).
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juries under the doctrine of contributory negligence because of his
failure to wear an available seat belt?
To date, defense attorneys have attempted to establish the de-
fense of contributory negligence under two theories. They may con-
tend that since the legislature has enacted a statute requiring the in-
stallation of seat belts in all new cars, it intended that they be used,
and a failure to use available belts is a breach of a statutory duty and
constitutes negligence per se. If this theory fails, or if the state does
not have a seat belt statute, it may be contended that the plaintiff did
not exercise the care required of a reasonably prudent man under the
same or similar circumstances, and he should be denied recovery un-
der the common law defense of contributory negligence."
Statutory Standard of Negligence
Most seat belt statutes are of the same basic type. These statutes
require that all automobiles manufactured after a certain7 period be
equipped with seat belts in the front seat, and specify that the installed
belts be of a quality approved by the Society of Automotive Engineers
or an appropriate state agency. The West Virginia statute is typical
in providing that:
No dealer in new or used automobiles shall sell, lease, transfer
or trade, at retail, any passenger automobile which is manufac-
tured after January one, one thousand nine hundred sixty-five,
unless such vehicle is equipped with safety belts for the front
seat, which seat belts shall meet the standards set and approved
by the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc."1
The enactment of such a statute raises the question of whether
a duty is imposed upon the occupant of an automobile to use an
available seat belt in caring for his own safety. If so, the failure to
use an available seat belt may be a defense since a violation of the
statute would constitute conduct that is negligence per se. Such a
defense would allege that since the installation of seat belts was
made mandatory by the legislature, it impliedly intended that they be
used. As yet, however, this defense has been uniformly rejected by
those courts which have directly considered the question. In Bentzler
10 For a discussion of the two theories, see THE DEFENSE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, INc., THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE (1967); Kleist, The Seat Belt De-
fense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 613 (1967); Note, Seat
Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 288 (1967).
"' W. VA. CODE ch. 17c, art. 15, § 43 (Michie 1967).
1968]
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v. Braun,'2 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the Wiscon-
sin installation statute could not be considered a safety statute which
would make it negligence per se for an occupant of an automobile to
fail to use available seat belts. In Miller v. Miller,'" the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that seat belt enactments were not absolute
safety measures and no statutory duty to use the belts could be im-
plied from these statutes. A United States District Court reached a
similar conclusion in Robinson v. Bone," when it held that, inasmuch
as the Oregon legislation does not require the use of the belts, the
failure to use them, under Oregon law, is not negligence per se.
If failure to wear available seat belts were found to be a viola-
tion of a statutory duty and thus negligence, it would raise several
questions. It could be inferred that since the statute only requires
seat belts in the front seat, occupants in the front seat are held to a
higher standard of care than occupants in the rear seat. Such a de-
termination would also imply that drivers or passengers in automobiles
manufactured after January 1, 1965 are required to exercise a higher
degree of care than persons in pre-1965 automobiles. Moreover, sus-
taining such a defense might also raise the constitutional question of
a "denial of equal protection." 5 These installation statutes normally
require seat belts to be installed in automobiles manufactured after
a certain period. They do not require installation in all automobiles
in use on the highways. It would thus become a question of whether
such a classification is a reasonable one. It may then follow that
since such a distinction imposes a higher duty on those persons op-
erating a newer automobile than on those operating an automobile
manufactured before the required statutory installation period, the
classification is unreasonable in that it is an arbitrary and discrimin-
atory classification which constitutes a denial of equal protection of
the laws.
12 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). Accord Cierpisz v. Singleton,
247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967).
13 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
14 285 F. Supp. 423 (Ore. 1968).
'1 U.S. CON sT. amend. XIV, § 1. Questions may also arise as to
whether federal legislation dealing with safety belts and other safety devices
has pre-empted the area of establishing safety standards for automobiles. See
15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (Supp. 1967). Congress has provided that whenever a
federal motor vehicle safety standard has been established, no state or political
sub-division of a state shall have any authority to establish or continue in
effect any safety standard which is not identical to the federal standard unless
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Common Law Standard of Ordinary Care
If failure to use a seat belt is not negligence per se, it could be
contributory negligence only when the plaintiff's failure to use the
seat belt amounted to a lack of the ordinary care required of a rea-
sonably prudent man under the same or similar circumstances.'" Con-
tributory negligence is generally an affirmative defense, and the bur-
den is on the defendant to prove such conduct.'" The first difficulty
the defendant will encounter in meeting this burden will be the neces-
sity of persuading the trial court that evidence concerning the failure
to wear seat belts should be admissible.
In the first reported seat belt case, Sams v. Sams,'" the South Car-
olina Supreme Court held that an allegation in the defendant's plead-
ing relating to the plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence in fail-
ing to use a seat belt "should not have been stricken and that the ul-
timate questions raised by the alleged defense should be decided in
light of all the facts and circumstances adduced upon the trial, rather
than being decided simply on the pleading."' 9 This view appears to
have been partially accepted by the Indiana Appellate Court in
Kavanagh v. Butorac ° when the court stated that admissibility of
the particular evidence in each case is within the discretion of the
trial judge. After taking judicial notice of public records and sur-
veys, however, the court held that it could not "in this case say as
a matter of law that failure to use available seat belts is contributory
negligence." 2'
However, the District Court of Appeals of Florida rejected the
impliedly far reaching decision of the Sams case and refused to adopt
a similar rule for Florida.22 In this case, the Florida court upheld a
motion to strike the defense of contributory negligence based on the
plaintiff's failure to use available seat belts and upheld the denial of
the trial court to permit evidence of the failure to use the belt. The
court noted that "the plaintiff and defendant could each have ar-
gued on the merits of the use of seat belts, but each argument would
necessarily have been conjectural and of doubtful propriety."2 Addi-
16 Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65, 70 (N.C. 1968).
17 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 64 at 426 (3d ed. 1964).
18 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966).
19 Id. at 470, 148 S.E.2d at 155.20 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. 1966).
21 Id. at 831.
2 Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1966).
22 Id. at 51.
1968]
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tionally, other courts refuse to consider the use of seat belts as a de-
fense by reasoning that such a determination should be made by the
legislature.24
It thus becomes apparent that the issue of whether evidence of
plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence for failure to wear an avail-
able seat belt should be admitted has been treated in three different
ways: first, leave the question of admissibility to the discretion of the
trial judge in each case; second, refuse to admit evidence on the issue
at all; third, leave the determination of a standard to the legislature.
The legislature has made such a determination in at least two states.25
If the defendant is permitted to introduce evidence concerning the
failure to wear seat belts, he must then prove his defense. To meet
this burden and establish the defense, three elements must be shown:
first, a standard of care; second, a failure to meet the requirements
of the standard resulting in an injury to the plaintiff; and third, a
causal relation between the failure to conform to the standard and
the resulting injury.2
To establish common law contributory negligence the same stand-
ard is used as when negligence is the issue. The plaintiff is required
to conform to the same broad standard of conduct as would be fol-
lowed by a reasonable man of ordinary prudence under similar cir-
cumstances.2 It thus becomes a question of whether a reasonable
man of ordinary prudence would use an available seat belt. If he
would, this creates a standard of self-protective care.
Certain statistical studies have indicated that occupants of passen-
ger cars utilize seat belts only about twenty-five percent of the time.2
This may be rationalized on the ground of fear of entrapment in a
burning or submerged car or on the belief that seat belts increase the
frequency or severity of injury to the spine, pelvis and abdomen. 9
Whatever the reason, it is evident that the average ordinary man has
not yet accepted seat belts or their utility. Accordingly, some courts
have reasoned that the scant use made of seat belts and the difficulty
24 Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967).
25 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 29, § 1368A (Supp. 1968); IOWA CODE §
321.445 (1966).
26 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 64 (3d ed. 1964).
27 Id.
28 NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcIL, ACCIDENT FACTS at 53 (1968 ed.).
29 16 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FAcTS, Seat Belt Accidents § 5 (1965).
[Vol. 71
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incident to determining a proper standard indicates that the courts
should not impose a duty on occupants of cars to wear seat belts."
If the court or jury is satisfied that a reasonably prudent man would
have made use of available seat belts under the circumstances, the
next obstacle in establishing contributory negligence would be the
showing that the plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt was a
factor which contributed to his injury." However, this would
be very difficult to prove because of the speculation and conjecture
involved in trying to ascertain which injuries were caused by the de-
fendant's negligence, and which were caused by the plaintiff's failure
to use an available seat belt? 2
Conclusion
In recent years, the American public has been subjected to an ex-
tensive safety campaign aimed at encouraging the use of seat belts,
and more courts will ultimately be forced to decide whether failure
to use a seat belt constitutes contributory negligence. At present,
sixty per cent of all occupants of automobiles do not use seat belts
which are available to them.33 If contributory negligence is imposed,
many of these people could be denied recovery for injuries caused by
the negligence of another. Moreover, it would seem inconsistent to
allow seat belt legislation, which is designed to aid and protect auto-
mobile passengers, to be used as a basis to deny recovery to them.
It would be a windfall for negligent defendants, and instead of en-
couraging safety, it would reward carelessness. The utility of seat
30 E.g., Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1968).
31 In Barry v. Coca Cola Co., 239 A.2d 273, 276 (N.J. 1967), Judge
Lynch stated that this type of proof would have to be by expert testimony
and many difficulties would be encountered.
It would have to be based upon a hypothetical question of detailed
specificity, strictly tailored to the facts proved with respect to the kind
of seat belt used, its adjustment, the distance of the passenger from, let
us say, the windshield, and many other imponderables which I would
not attempt to fully envision here.
32 Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTINGS
L.J. 613, 615 (1967).
In any given collision, no doctor can say exactly what injuries would
have been suffered had the victim been wearing a seat belt as compared
to those he suffered without it. There are too many unknown variables
such as exact number, degree, direction, duration, and kinds of forces
that might have been acting in any given accident to answer the ques-
tion with any accuracy. The problem is further complicated when one
considers the effect of these forces in conjunction with the positions of
potential obstacles such as dashknobs, turn signal levers, etc.
33 NATIONAL SAFETY CouNciL, AccIDENTs FACTS at 53 (1968 ed.).
1968]
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belts as a safety device must be clarified, and they must be generally
worn by the public before a judicially imposed standard would be
acceptable.3"
Frank Edward Jolliffe
34 Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 WIs. L.
REv. 288, 296-297.
mhe issue of the social utility of the use of seat belts is definitely
not clarified in the minds of the public and the courts. Doubts remain
as to whether seat belts cause injury, and the real usefulness of the
seat belt in preventing injuries has not become public knowledge . . ..
The social utility of wearing a seat belt must be established in the mind
of the public before failure to use a seat belt can be held to be negligence.
Otherwise the court would be imposing a standard of conduct rather
than applying a standard accepted by society.
8
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